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The Mexican oil syndrome: current 
vulnerability and longer-term viability 
Dr Robert E. Looney 
MEXICO'S OIL discoveries in the mid-1990s, together with expanded pro-
duction levels of hydrocarbons, have and will continue to have several impor-
tant impacts on the country. First, they have provided the Mexican authori-
ties with the means of fundamentally changing the status quo between itself 
and the United States. Secondly, although Mexico's econorµic power was 
suddenly increased, its vulnerability was similarly increased as the govern-
ment failed to develop any type of contingency plan in anticipation of oil 
revenue shortfalls. And thirdly, the interdependence betw~en the 
government, the private sector and various groups within the country grew 
as the government developed an accelerated growth strategy in collaboration 
with the private sector. 
A purview of the main guidelines for oil policy before 1978 reveals 
them to be reasonable, if imprecise. Broadly speaking, 1 oil was considered a 
key to development - an element that would make dynamic economic 
growth possible. It was thought that oil's main contribution would be to 
eliminate, or at least reduce, the effects of two factors that had restricted the 
economy's growth capacity in the past. The first was the balance of payments 
in which Mexico had traditionally experienced a current account deficit, 
while the second was public sector ~ayings and spending constraints. Income 
obtained from production and exports was to be properly used in accordance 
with national development priorities. This placed implicit, yet clear, restric-
tions on oil exports - that the volume of generated exports should not out-
strip the country's capacity to absorb foreign currency earnings from the 
sector. 2 
In order to improve living standards and generate employment for the 
growing population, this strategy was dramatically altered in 1978 with expan-
sionary policies which relied on rapidly rising oil revenues, high public and 
private expenditures and an accumulation of external debt. Unfortunately, 
these measures, whiie succeeding in increasing the real per capita income by 
almost 25 per cent from 1978 to 1981 and substantially reducing employment 
in the economy, were, as recent events have shown, highly vulnerable to any 
drop in oil revenues. 
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The strategy adopted after 1978 eventually led to the so-called "oil 
syndrome" ,3 characterized in part by: (1) rapid but unbalanced growth, led 
by the OCC sector and accompanied by the development of several 
bottlenecks; (2) accelerated inflation, generated by excess demand liquidity 
in the presence of deficient supply; (3) rapid capital-intensive investment in 
the industrial sector; (4) the enlargement of the role of government, mainly 
via infrastructural investment and an expanded welfare and subsidy system; 
and (5), an over-valued exchange rate leading to the stagnation of non-oil 
exports. 
More precisely, while the country's ambitious growth policy resulted in 
average real income growth of 8.2 per cent between 197 8 and 1981, the long-
term growth capacity of the economy was only approximately six per cent. 
The result, as expected, was increased inflation. With an apparent unwilling-
ness to reform the tax system, budget deficits had reached 16 per ,cent of 
gross domestic product (up from the historical average of 4- 5 per cent) by 
1982. In addition, the authorities maintained a fixed exchange rate for most 
of the 1977 -81 period, in spite of inflation rates of 20- 30 per cent. As a 
result of the over-valued exchange rate, non-oil exports stagnated. 4 
The country's 1982 economic crisis can also be traced to external 
factors. Primary among the most recent external causes was a weakening of 
the world market for oil and higher international interest rates. Oil exports 
amounted to only $14 billion in 1981, instead of the $20 billion anticipated 
by the government. Furthermore, increasing world interest rates, combined 
with rising debt, drove the interest burden from $5.4 billion in 1980 to $8.2 
billion in 1981. 
After three major devaluations' (the peso fell from around 26 per dollar 
in early 1982 to 160/$ by the end of the year) and several half-hearted self-
imposed stabilization efforts, the government finally agreed in late 1982 to a 
fairly severe International Monetary Fund Stabilization Programme for 
1983-85, over which time the country committed itself to reducing govern-
ment deficits from 16 per cent of GNP to around 3.5 per cent. 5 
In early 1983, lacking the financial resources needed to make interest 
payments let alone principal payments on the debt, the Mexican government 
negotiated a rescheduling of debt service, in order to avoid defaulting. 
Mexico was thus able to avoid a financial crisis in the short term, but whether 
or not that crisis can be resolved in the long term depends upon one's percep-
tion of its sources. 
In one view, the financial crisis reflects worldwide recession and a dete-
rioration in the world market for petroleum. According to this view, the crisis 
is seen as a temporary aberration in an otherwise healthy economy, and the 
resolution of the crisis requires modifications to Mexico's energy policy. 
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Once world petroleum markets recover, the assumption is that Mexico will 
6 be able to generate the revenues needed to finance the external debt. 
A different view contends that the 1981/82 financial crisis under Lopez 
Portillo was the sequel to a similar crisis in 1976 during the last year of the 
Echevarria administration. According to this view, these financial crises are 
not temporary aberrations, but rather the culmination of monetary and fiscal 
policies pursued by both of these administrations over many years - policies 
that will continue to dictate the options open to the Mexican government in 
the foreseeable future. The resolution of the financial crises in the long term 
will come not from modifications in energy policies or recovery in world 
petroleum markets, but rather from monetary and fiscal policies designed to 
achieve stable growth in the Mexican economy. 7 
While not disagreeing with this latter position, this study takes a dif-
ferent view of Mexico's current economic problems and future pro§pects. It 
is argued below that a number of longer-run structural problems inherent in 
the government's oil-based development strategy may be more instrumental 
in affecting its overall success than likely future monetary/fiscal policies. 
The purpose of this article is, therefore, to look somewhat beyond the 
present crisis, 8 in order to assess the validity, and the likelihood of success, of 
the country's oil-based development strategy. 
Alternative development strategies 
Several possible alternative strategies were both logical and feasible for 
the government to implement in 1978: 
1. A rapid increase in the production of crude oil. 
2. Expanded crude oil production, but based largely on domestic 
needs. 
3. A poiicy of diversified industrialization. 
4. A policy mix consisting of moderate industrialization and the 
development of service sectors - government employment. 
5. A high growth strategy of petroleum-based industrialization, 
combined with high and steady levels of oil exports. 
Each of these strategies had certain advantages and disadvantages. 2 
Clearly, the strategy of expanding the production and export of crude would 
have increased revenues, but at the same time it would also have increased 
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the country's external vulnerability and risked increasing internal friction be-
tween the government and various conservationist-nationalistic groups. 
Likewise, a stabilization of output levels for domestic needs and supplemen-
tal foreign exchange earnings would have minimized dislocations and infla-
tionary pressures, but would not have permitted the government to address 
the country's growing unemployment problem. 
Ultimately, the country adopted a strategy embodied in the Industrial 
Development Plan with its orientation towards some sort of viable interde-
pendence between the US and Mexico, together with its implicit compromise 
between nationalistic and high growth-oriented domestic groups - viable 
interdependence, whereby the domestic investment of oil revenues in heavy 
industries (made possible by high levels of exports) was seen as the best 
means of achieving some sort of balance between efficiency and 
vulnerability. Through government investment of oil revenues, the ~uthori­
ties sought structural change capable of: 
(1) Increasing the ability of the country to utilize more of its oil 
and gas resources domestically (so that the country's depen-
dence on hydrocarbon exports could be curtailed). 
(2) Increasing the country's ability to produce and trade products 
derived from hydrocarbons. 
(3) Enabling the country to trade and bargain on relatively equal 
technological and economi~ ~rounds. 
(4) Making the country less vulnerable to the effects of severe 
market fluctuations or sudden changes in the politics and 
trade policies of the US and other developed countries. 
The arguments advanced by the government for placing hydrocarbon 
exports at the centre of its development strategy were many and varied: 9 
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1. There was a large increase in proven hydrocarbon reserves dis-
closed from the early months of the Lopez Portillo administra-
tion onward. 
2. Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) employed the largest work-
force in Mexico, and expansion of.the company would generate 
further jobs, both in the oil industry itself and in other 
branches of the economy. 
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3. The apparent absence of near-term close hydrocarbon substi-
tutes might lead to a drop in oil consumption on the interna-
tional market (inelastic demand). For this reason, it was 
thought in Mexico that there was nothing to stop the national 
oil company from becoming an important world market 
supplier. The only obstacles with which PEMEX might have to 
contend (technology and finance) were overcome through 
long experience as an independent enterprise and the com-
pany's easy access to loans, since it possessed long-term 
resources with which to make repayments. 
4. There was security inherent in the knowledge that hydrocarbon 
resources were controlled by Mexican personnel and know-
how (PEMEX was the first oil industry of the Third World to 
be nationalized). Therefore, it seemed feasible to rationally 
plan the exploitation and disposition of oil, in keeping with the 
overall objectives of national development, and it was possible 
to prevent the situation arising, as it did in the case of durable 
consumer goods, whereby expansion of the industry was under-
taken in accordance with the interests of foreign firms or 
investors. 
5. It was possible to keep the price elasticity of demand for hydro-
carbons low over a prolonged period, thereby ensuring relative-
ly broader profit margins i11 international sales than other pro-
ducts exported by Mexico. 
6. The short-term viability of oil contributed to the solution of 
the long-standing problems to which the Mexican economy 
had been subject and reduced the social pressures to which 
these gave rise. 
It was furthermore agreed that higher income and employment levels 
of the labour force should be made basic objectives of economic development 
in Mexico. Theoretically, these objectives are complementary: a national in-
crease in income implies an increase in levels of employment. The strategy 
implemented to achieve this end was an attempt to influence national ex-
penditure decisions in certain areas, such as personal consumption, private 
investment, government expenditure ancHoreign trade. 
Oil, therefore, initially offered the possibility of attacking existing 
economic problems on the dual fronts of foreign indebtedness and public 
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expenditure. The major state expenditures required to strengthen the pro-
ductive capacity of PEMEX had the advantage of producing ample returns, 
giving results in a relatively short time through hydrocarbon exports. 
Subsequently, the multiplier effect of government expenditure and the 
security of having available plentiful supplies of resources of high interna-
tional value, together with certain major measures of economic policy, 
among them the freezing of domestic energy prices, allowed the two remain-
ing components, namely personal consumption and private investment, to 
be given new momentum. 10 Unfortunately, the overall increase in the 
components of total gross expenditure produced the demand pressures lead-
ing up to the 1981/82 crisis. 
Two characteristics 11 of the oil industry in Mexico are important in un-
derstanding its role during the years of expansion (1978-81), the crisis 
(1982) and the subsequent adjustment period (1983 +). Since oil in.Mexico 
is state-owned, the increases in both internal and external sales of oil-related 
products constituted an increasingly important source of revenue to the 
government. Also, the transfers of such revenues to the rest of the economy 
had to be undertaken through budgetary measures. On the other hand, since 
oil is an export good, the transformation of oil into other goods or assets had 
to take place through the importation of goods and securities. 
One would expect that the additional resources that accrued to the 
government would have resulted in a relative increase in the size of the 
public sector commensurate with the growing importance of the petroleum 
sector in the economy. Also, greater oil exports imply an opening of the 
economy (measured by the relative increase of the foreign sector). But, in an 
attempt to speed up economic grnwth and modernize the economy, the 
government embarked upon vast expansions not only of the oil sector but 
also of other key areas of the industrial sector where private investment was 
considered insufficient. As a result, the government's role in the economy, 
as measured by the magnitude of public expenditure, was expanded far 
beyond the relative increase of the petroleum sector. 
Potential development problems 
As a result of the high-growth, oil-based development strategy pursued 
after 1977, it was apparent by as early as 1981 that: 
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1. The country was becoming increasingly dependent upon oil ex-
ports and upon the impact of these oil revenues on the domes-
tic economy. 
• 
2. The strategy was largely a resource-based, capital-intensive pro-
cess of industrialization, with agriculture playing a largely 
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passive role in maintaining a structural balance, and the non-
economic one of ensuring some level of food self-reliance. 
3. The strategy required careful pre-planning and identification of 
profitable investments (particularly since the break with past 
· patterns of growth had been so radical). 
4. The strategy had been deficient in assessing realistically the 
manpower and education requirements of such industries. 
5. Little attention had been given to the identification of opera-
tional means of shifting from essentially an import substitution 
development strategy to one more viable in terms of the coun-
try's comparative advantage. 
These difficulties were identified by the authorities and to a certain 
extent addressed in the "NationaJ Development Plan 1983-88" which was 
released in mid-1983. The plan emphasizes the need to substantially increase 
non-petroleum exports and to correct financial disequilibria, especially the 
difficult financial situation of private firms and the fiscal deficit of the public 
sector, and cites the first of these as a prime obstacle to economic recovery 
and the second as an instrument for establishing price stability. The plan also 
stresses the need to increase domestic savings (due to limitations on securing 
additional external financial resources). Finally, as regards the increasing 
problems of unemployment and underemployment, the plan recognizes that 
they can only be solved through ff shift to more labour-intensive activities. 
Thus the agricultural sector, in particular, is to be favoured by integrated 
rural development programmes and improvements in the terms of trade of 
that sector with the rest of the Mexican economy. 
In addition, the de la Madrid administration has shown 12 that it is capa-
ble of restricting spending, imports and foreign currency sales. The fiscal 
deficit dropped from 17 .6 per cent of GDP to 8.6 per cent between 1982 and 
1983. It fell further in 1984, although not to the 5.5 per cent target set in the 
agreement with the IMF, or even to the modified goal that the Mexican 
government allowed itself in the 1984 budget. According to official figures, 
worked out with the IMF using a new accounting method, the 1984 deficit 
was 6.2 per cent of GDP. If the oil accounting method is used, a figure of well 
above seven per cent may be estimated. Imports and foreign currency sales 
were also severely restricted, in order to conserve the foreign exchange 
needed for restoring depleted central bank reserves and for maintaining debt 
service payments. In addition, the value added tax was increased for revenue 
purposes. 
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Mexico bore a 5.8 per cent drop in real GDP equivalent to about 11 per 
cent in per capita terms, during 1982 and 1983. Inflation peaked at 98.8 per 
cent in 1982 and slid back to 80 per cent in 1983. The trade deficit of$4.5 bil-
lion in 1981 became a surplus of $6.8 billion in 1982 - a surplus which grew 
to $13.7 billion in 1983. 
By mid-1984, an innovative debt-restructuring package had been final-
'ized and an agreement with the foreign bank ·steering committee achieved in 
August. This arrangement spread the renegotiated portion of the public sec-
tor's debt - $48.7 billion - over 14 years, and reduced the capital amortiza-
tion payments on the whole government debt by over $35 billion for the rest 
of the de la Madrid presidency (1983-88). 
From the outset, 1984 was viewed as the year when the transition from 
emergency measures to stable growth policies would have to occur. After 
demonstrating in 1983 that it could apply with clarity and efficiency tqe diffi-
cult policies over which it had no choice, the government in 1984 had to 
show its ability to make choices about the shape of the post-crisis period. It 
had to decide where and how much to spend, rather than what to cut. 
The 1981 - 82 crisis and aftermath demonstrated that sustainable long-
term recovery and a pattern of steady growth can no longer be sustained on 
the basis of foreign borrowing and oil income. As the presidential announce-
ments of the first quarter of 1985 stressed, a recovery that simultaneously 
allows for the improvement of the foreign payments position and for ade-
quate employment growth must be based on exports, related investment and 
improved consumer demand, the latter only feasible if inflation is reduced 
and purchasing power improved. 
Unfortunately, the policies of the last quarter of 1984 involved high 
government expenditure and money supply growth, which, if continued, 
could keep inflation high and irregular, thereby discouraging investment and 
making necessary a continuous slippage of the peso at a quick pace. Exports 
might still prosper in response to a competitive exchange rate, but, as in 
Brazil, a scenario of healthy exports and raging inflation could develop. 
The government has shown in three ways that it does not wish this to 
happen: 
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1. It has announced a new package of cutbacks in spending and 
the intention ·of improving its accounts by selling some para-
state enterprises. 
2. Measures have been introduced to combat excess monetary 
liquidity. In addition, a new Baneo de Mexico law placing a 
fixed upper limit on the government's credit from it was put 
into place. 
OPEC Review 
3. A new set of export promotion policies was announced in April 
1985. 
All of these measures, if successfully implemented, could work together 
to move the structure of the economy in the right direction: 
1. Exports could become a greater parfof productive activity. 
2. The government's spending could be more tightly controlled 
and consistent with inflation goals. 
3. Inefficient public sector enterprises could be eliminated or 
improved. 
The latest IMF accord, the third and last required under the original 
three-year extended fund facility negotiated in 1982, introduces new ele-
ments in recognition of the vital necessity of fundamentally improving 
Mexico's trade situation. Instead of just dealing with financial and final 
policy targets, this year's letter of intent specifies that the protection of the 
Mexican economy from foreign competition is to be reduced, and the 
"anti-export bias" to be diminished: 
1. The replacement of the current import permit regime with one 
of tariffs is to be the main instrument of trade policy. 
2. The placement of tariffs on 35-45 per cent of imported goods, 
goods which previously required permits, is foreseen at the end 
of 1985. 
3. The liberalization of imports is intended to involve product 
categories which are domestically produced, as well as those 
which are not available in the domestic market. 
The clear goal of this set of policies is to force domestic producers into 
improving their production methods enough to be able to compete on the 
world market. The previous system of import permits often had the same 
effect as that of extremely high tariffs - it prevented any foreign goods from 
entering the country, thus allowing the domestic producers of similar goods 
to have a form of monopoly on the local market. These local manufacturers 
often produced inefficiently, charged high prices and still maintained a pro-
fitable business. Under such protective policies, they would never have 
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learned to export because their production methods would have tended to 
fall, with the passage of time, further and further behind world standards. 
There are several additional structural problems that are potentially 
serious enough to warrant government action. It is difficult to prioritize these 
problems in terms of their relative importance for concern. A tentative list, 
however, includes: (1) US-Mexican frictions; (2) a worsening of the world 
food situation; and (3), a deterioration of income distribution. 
Deterioration in these areas will most likely create problems which, if 
left unattended, could undermine the country's whole development effort. 
US-Mexican frictions 
US energy difficulties have more or less coincided with: (1) the large 
oil discoveries in Mexico; (2) sharply rising Mexican exports of other 
products, e.g. agricultural items to the US; and (3), an awareness that.approx-
imately six million Mexicans are living in the US, many of them illegally. 
It is clear, in the light of (2) and (3) above, that the scope for Mexican 
discretionary action in oil production and export rates is rather limited, partic-
ularly in terms of the recent fall in oil prices. Estimates are that it will take in-
creases in crude oil production rates of at least ten per cent per annum 
through the 1980s and into the 1990s if Mexico is to create a sufficient 
number of jobs to reduce and eventually eliminate the need for Mexicans to 
migrate to the US in search of work. 
Mutual interest over the long term is thus likely to bring an increase in 
pragmatism in Mexican/US relations, with an eventual reduction in dogma-
tism on the Mexican side, though this will presumably be provided by the 
politicians as long as their domestic audiences require it. 
Present Mexican policy appears committed to maintaining existing 
Mexican markets in the US and opening up new ones. Faced with the benefits 
of this increased exchange in terms of industrial and agricultural 
employment, any future Mexican government would have to consider care-
fully the implications of embarking on policies which might prove damaging 
to US interests. 
As oil wealth brings average Mexican income levels closer to those of 
the US, pressures to migrate from Mexico to the US should lessen. By that 
time, the Mexican-American community in the US will have become a much 
larger, wealthier, more respected and more permanent feature of US life. 
These tendencies cannot but more closely link the two countries and increase 
their mutual interests. 
But, despite movements towards a closer identity of interests, it would 
be erroneous for Americans to believe that increased wealth will make the 
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Mexicans more "reasonable". They will continue to wish to preserve and 
develop their own very distinct traditions and institutions, many of which 
they consider superior to those of the US. 
Worsening of the world food situation 
The world food situation is likely to ~ontinue to deteriorate over the 
next 20 years as population pressures begin to make themselves felt and the 
amount of usable land per capita declines. 13 While existing technology 
should be able to offset this trend, the inability of many developing countries 
to implement productivity increases (largely because of political reasons) 
will mean lagging output. The result will be increases in scarcity whereby 
food, even if available, will sell for much higher prices, causing Mexico's bal-
ance of payments to deteriorate drastically. 
Agriculture is surely the weak link in any chain of integrated develop-
ment policies in Mexico. The Industrial Development Plan itself pointed out 
that a doubling of public investment in the sector between 1977 and 1982 
will barely arrest the decline in agricultural output, and if that output grew no 
faster than the three per cent minimum rate projected in the plan, food im-
ports would require 21 per cent of petroleum export revenues in 1983 and 54 
per cent in 1990. 14 
The problem is not that Mexican agriculture has stopped growing, but 
that the rate of growth has moderated. From the mid-1940s through the 
mid-1950s, production grew at a phenomenal rate as new land was brought 
under cultivation, more terrain irrigated and improved technologies adopted. 
Since 1965, output has barely been able to keep up with the growth of 
population. 
Demand has been growing at an even faster pace than the population. 
Real income growth and the shift from a rural to an urban society also con-
tributed to the growth in food consumption per capita. 
Between 1930 and 1960, the population of Mexico doubled. It took only 
20 years for it to double again, reaching almost 70 million people in 1980. 
Projections for the year 2000 place the population at a minimum of 105 mil-
lion people. This means that, between 1980 and 2000, agricultural output 
must grow by over two per cent yearly just to maintain per capita income. 15 
While real per capita income has grown, however, food prices have 
been held down artificially. The minimum wage has grown faster than the 
cost of food. Between 1960 and 1980, overall food costs grew only half as fast 
as the minimum wage. In other words, the income effect on top of depressed 
food prices pushed up demand even faster than would normally have been 
expected. Since 1982, however, the fall id real per capita income and a slow-
down in the growth of subsidies has resulted in a deterioration in the quality 
of food consumption. 
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Moderate production, in the face of dynamic growth demand, has 
meant that increasingly Mexico, as noted above, has had to purchase key 
items of food on the world market to satisfy its needs. 
It can be argued that Mexico, up until the Mexican Food System 
(Sistema Alimentario Mexicano or SAM) was announced in 1980, did not 
have a coherent food or agriculture policy. Public debate has historically 
centred around land tenure and reform, not food production. 
SAM was an attempt to link food consumption and production within a 
broad conceptual policy framework. It proposed to correct past mistakes by 
redirecting investment and expenditure back to the countryside. Consump-
tion was to be subsidized and reoriented, while production was to be redirect-
ed towards national self-sufficiency and basic goods through higher prices 
and extensive subsidies. 
Although food output did grow, in terms of its stated goal, SAM was 
less than a complete success (including the question of whether or not the 
goals - especially that of self-sufficiency - were realistic). Among the more 
important reasons for the lack of success was the fact that SAM did not take 
shape until practically the end of the Lopez Portillo administration. Agricul-
tural change is a long-term phenomenon. To expect important structural 
changes to take place in less than two years is wishful thinking. Also, the 
implementation which deviated from the original programme was based on 
massive subsidies. With the economic crisis of 1982, SAM, as well as many 
other programmes, was dropped for fiscal reasons. 
The deadline for the major Mexican goal - food self-sufficiency by 
1985 (set by former President ~ose Lopez Portillo under the SAM 
programme) - will not be met, nor even closely approached. The food indus-
try is seriously affected by problems: scarcity of products, the irregular rise of 
prices and subsidies, and questions of how to advertise nutritional value and 
how to finance development. 
Given the present situation, the state has proposed, as its goal of a mini-
mum food industry, growth through 1988 parallel to that of the population. 
This would mean an average annual growth level of 2.5 per cent, which thus 
would sustain the present per capita consumption. Achievement of this goal 
is not easy, however, because of the series of problems which hinder overall 
development in this sector: 
1. Lack of stimuli for private investment. 
2. High interest rates and credit restrictions. 
3. Little capital goods importation due to lack of foreign currency. 
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4. Landholding irregularities. 
5. Untimely price revision policies. 
As such, the issues facing the food industry consist of problems which 
have no easy solution, will take time, and unfortunately are very much affect-
ed by Mexico's current economic crisis and its burgeoning population. The 
agriculture industry's problems of food production, price controls, industrial 
development, land holdings and financing are all challenges from which the 
Mexican government cannot turn away and which it will have to continually 
address. 
The dilemma facing policy-makers is that, with over 60 per cent of the 
population in the cities, the government is and must be concerned about the 
availability and costs of food for the urban dweller. The National Fq.od Pro-
gramme (PRONAL) is basically a consumption-oriented plan. Among its ob-
jectives is the pursuit of "food and nutritional sovereignty" so as to permit 
the "full development of the abjlities and potential of every Mexican". 
Within the overall framework of reduced subsidies, the government 
nevertheless maintains that selective food subsidies are imperative. 
Additionally, it projects a greater role for CONASUPO (the Federal Con-
sumer Goods Agency) in processed food production and the continuation of 
imports by this organization, in order to guarantee the supply of food to the 
Mexican people. 
More than any other factor, the policy towards agriculture has been 
shaped by the general budgetary restr.ictions that have characterized the first 
years of the de la Madrid administration. While agriculture-related expendi-
ture increased as a proportion of total spending in real terms, it fell in 1983 
and was expected to grow in 1984. Subsidies have been reduced and, al-
though prices have increased, they are still depressed relative to the costs of 
agricultural inputs. There has been a slowdown in infrastructural growth, 
with an accompanying emphasis on small-scale irrigation schemes in place of 
larger projects. 
The current emphasis is on integrated rural development. Increases in 
output alone are not seen as sufficient to solve the problem of rural poverty 
or to slow the stream of migrants to the cities. A large proportion of the 
budget going to the countryside is directed towards programmes designed to 
improve rural living standards, in such areas as health, housing, education 
and employment generation. 
Despite the encouraging directions of these changes, considerable orga-
nizational difficulties are developing, not the least of which is corruption at 
the local level and a mistrust of administrators of the programmes by the 
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traditional farming community. Despite these reservations, a significant in-
crease in the resources reaching the farmers is to be expected and, with this, 
corresponding increases in output and productivity should come, if not by 
the target dates, at least by 1990. 
Deterioration in income distribution 
There is evidence that, in Mexico (as in many other developing 
countries), rapid growth is resulting in a worsening of the already highly 
unequal distribution of income. 16 Unless action is taken soon, the deteriora-
tion may become even more severe in the 1980s. 
In a major study of income distribution in Mexico, Nugent and Tara-
wenh 17 found that, between 1950 and 1970, poverty was halved. Whereas, in 
1950, it would have taken 14.6 per cent of the income of the non-poor to 
eliminate poverty, by 1970 it would have only required 7.1 per cent of their 
income. 
Clearly, however, since the population has grown by about three per 
cent per year and the size of the non-poor's per capita income has increased 
substantially, the magnitude of the problem has certainly not diminished. 
Indeed, Nugent and Tarawenh's findings indicate that poverty could have 
been reduced much more had it not been for an unfortunate and rather 
general tendency for inequality in the distribution of income to increase. By 
their calculations, the overall Gini coefficient of income inequality among 
Mexico's economically active population increased by 0.174. 
While a portion of this increase may be attributed to the typical pattern 
of growing income differentials between agriculture and non-agriculture and 
between the poorest and the richest states, the bulk of the increase would 
seem to be attributable to increases in inequality within individual states and 
sectors, and especially within agriculture. 
In view of the considerable emphasis that is given to inter-sectoral ad-
justment programmes in achieving reduced income inequality, the rather 
massive extent to which rural-urban migration has taken place in Mexico, 
and the considerable amount of land that has been transferred from large pri-
vate landholders to ejidal tenure, a process that would be presumed to de-
crease inequality in the size of distribution of landholdings over time, Nu-
gent's and Tarawenh's findings are quite startling. 
Furthermore, while changes in relative income shares between 1950 
and 1970 tended to reduce both overall inequality and poverty, Nugent and 
Tarawenh found that population shares by themselves tended to increase 
income inequality and to reduce poverty r1'uch less than would have been ex-
pected (given the traditional view that migrants would be the marginal 
people who would bring with them their marginal products and thereby help 
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to reduce existing dualism and inequality). Thus, rural-urban migration may 
not on balance be the equilibrium mechanism that the economics literature 
has deemed it. Rather, migrants may be the infra-marginal persons who are 
among the more educated and healthier members of the rural population, 
whose departure leaves the rural sector less capitalized and more marginal 
than it was before and the urban sector even better endowed than it would 
have been without them. 
Finally, Nugent and Tarawenh's results suggest that, despite massive 
rural/urban migration in Mexico, poverty is increasingly a rural phenomenon 
and inequality has grown the most in agriculture, and especially in the lower 
income states. Therefore, clues to the resilience of poverty and increasing 
income inequality in the face of rapid economic growth and considerable 
land reform must be sought within the agricultural sector itself and especially 
in the poorest states of the country. 
In sum, the main problems preventing a better distribution of wealth 
appear to be the inability of the rural sector to generate sufficient wealth for 
its population. The excessive concentration of the population in the largest 
cities, making it difficult to provide adequate levels of services and to satisfy 
aspirations, particularly of the lowest-earning categories, may also be a major 
factor contributing to the country's income distributional problems. 
Whether these shortcomings are likely to be solved by the implementa-
tion of the government's policy in relation to urban and industrial develop-
ment (which aims at spreading growth more evenly around the country) is 
certainly problematical. Other moves, such as the Mexican Food System and 
the intention to provide a higher proportion of agricultural workers with 
regular wages appear more promising, at least in the near term. 
There is no reason why a conflict between equity and efficiency 18 has to 
arise in Mexico, even though, in its eagerness to promote growth, the govern-
ment has, until recently, tended to allocate oil revenues to capital-intensive 
industrial development capable of creating (at least directly) only a limited 
number of jobs. These investments have prevailed at the expense of more 
potentially labour-intensive investments located in the more populous areas. 
While it is clear that it is highly inefficient to completely counter the forces of 
economic efficiency solely on the basis of social efficiency criteria, it is clear 
in the light of the Iranian experience that a balance must soon be struck on 
both human and political grounds so as to prevent a disruption of Mexico's 
social fabric. 
Income distributional considerations translate themselves into the set-
ting of targets to minimize the urban/rurm income gap and the achievement 
of better inter-regional balances. Investments along these lines can be easily 
justified, given the potential social strains associated with the country's 
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present strategy. This conclusion holds, even though the resulting invest-
ment pattern might reduce the country's overall economic growth potential. 
Despite the fact that the government has long been concerned with the 
country's income distributional patterns, the authorities have never under-
taken a comprehensive income distributional set of policies. The Mexican 
government made many economic policy statements during the spring and 
summer of 1984 19 that provided clues as 'to the current administration's 
policy towards income distribution. The three documents that proposed to 
clarify or set the government's economic policy and measures relating to 
income distribution are: the National Development Financing Programme, 
or PRONAFIDE, issued on 4 June 1984; the National Industrial Promotion 
and Foreign Trade Programme, or PRONAFICE, released on 30 July 1984; 
and the president's lnforme. PRONAFIDE is intended to outline financial 
policy while the stated aim of PRONAFICE is "a more egalitarian spciety", 
which the government hopes to achieve through a strategy of self-sufficient 
and sustainable economic growth. 
PRONAFICE identifies industrial sectors that have not contributed 
strongly to exports in the past, or that have had negative trade balances, and 
posits a design for an industrial structure that would be more efficient, better 
able to compete in international markets, and less dependent on imported 
inputs and products. 
Other aspects of industrial development dealt with by PRONAFICE are 
technological development, territorial decentralization, national entrepre-
neurship and employment promotion. In each case, business decisions in ac-
cordance with the design of the programme will receive encouragement typi-
cally through tax breaks and similar fiscal measures, but possibly through 
selective financing and trade permits as well. 
With direct regard to income distribution, a large section of PRONA-
FICE deals with price policy and foreign investment. According to the 
programme, the former is intended to protect the purchasing power of wages, 
stimulate the prosecution of basic goods and generate adequate profit ratios, 
while avoiding inflation and speculative practices (such as hoarding). 
PRONAFICE requires a set of industrial incentives for its 
implementation. Such incentives will most likely fall into two categories -
preferential financing and fiscal benefits. The selective granting of credit will 
be handled by the banking system through adherence to a government-set 
proportional division of loan portfolios. The total amount of credit available, 
though, will continue to respond to interest rate policy, economic growth and 
other macro-economic variables, not to industrial policy. While fiscal incen-
tives can also be designed for specific purposes, their total value is limited by 
budgetary considerations. As long as the Mexican government adheres to a 
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policy of fiscal austerity (due both to agreements with the IMF and foreign 
bankers, and to a desire to reduce inflation as well as the public sector's 
demands on domestic credit availability), the total reduction in tax revenue 
allowable for incentive purposes will be strictly limited. 
Apart from the constraints on the absolute amount of resources that 
may be used for incentive purposes, there is also a problem of too many ob-
jectives for two policy tools to accomplish. location, research, employment 
training and exports cannot all be directed with only the preferential granting 
of credit and tax savings. Also, as the PRONAFICE document itself points 
out, the government will not prohibit companies from making independent 
choices of action in these matters - it can only offer "rewards" for those 
which fit in with a policy aim. 
In sum, the overall ability of the current administration to deal with the 
country's income distribution problem suffers not from a conceptual identifi-
cation of the main sources of income inequality, but rather from the fiscal 
limitations on implementing a broad-based attack on inequality. The same 
conclusion applies to the government's distributional programmes geared 
directly towards agriculture and the rural sector. 
Goreoux and Manne 20 have identified the slow growth of demand 
(domestic and export) as a serious constraint to agricultural growth con-
tributing to low rural incomes and adverse changes in the agricultural terms 
of trade. Rural incomes could be increased by higher support prices, adminis-
tered by Conasupo, at the cost of the welfare of the consumers and growing 
food stockpiles, unless Conasupo also subsidized domestic sales, which it 
does. Such funding, if not offset by t~JS: revenues, would, however, contribute 
to inflation. Oil as a source of foreign exchange offers the option of subsidized 
imported food as a non-inflationary option, at the cost of increased income 
inequality. 
Despite the serious problem of inequality in Mexico and the govern-
ment's existing income and wealth patterns, the country is still somewhat for-
tunate in that, by developing at a later point in time, it can avoid many of the 
mistakes made by Iran. 21 There is no question that a major lesson to be 
learned from Iran's development strategy is that, even though the level of 
income for most of the population may be increasing fairly rapidly, discontent 
is likely to arise if the gap between regions or urban/rural or even particular 
groups continues to widen. Adverse income distributional patterns of this 
sort ordinarily will not cause a problem if corrected fairly early. Increasing 
income disparity can, however, cause mass alienation, as in the case of Iran. 
This is most likely to occur during period~ such as 1978-81, when expecta-
tions of future living standards were accelerating (because of the knowledge 
of, and the accumulation of, wealth in relatively few hands). 
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Given lower expectations as to future incomes on the part of most 
lower-income individuals, together with increased concern on the part of the 
government for equality, Mexico, while not dramatically improving its 
income distributional pattern, may still be able to avoid the civil stand-off 
that overcame Iran. As noted above, however, at least in the near term, the 
government will be greatly constrained by fiscal considerations in imple-
menting a major attack on income inequality: 
Conclusions 
Based on the above considerations, recent trends in the economy, and 
the taking into account of the experience of other oil-exporting countries, it 
is likely therefore that: 
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1. Despite recent political difficulties with the US, Mexico will in-
crease its crude oil and natural gas exports to this country as 
the most readily accessible market. The case of making delivery 
and the high costs of processing gas and shipping oil to other 
markets will make contractual agreements mutually attractive, 
and balance of payments considerations will also encourage ex-
ports to the US. The Mexican government's desire to eliminate 
the vestiges of the 1982 crisis and the evident expansionist 
leadership of PEMEX reinforces a tendency to accelerate petro-
leum production, despite lingering efforts by some groups to 
return to a conservationist policy. 
2. The basic challenge for the de la Madrid government is how to 
plan for the expansion and development necessary to relieve 
the other structural problems outlined above - the food situa-
tion and income distribution - while practising the austerity 
dictated by conventional monetary and fiscal policy. Further on 
down the road, these structural factors will increasingly hinder 
stable growth, unless they are directly addressed. As a 
corollary, the nation will also have to choose soon between a 
protectionist policy of maintaining high-cost industry and limit-
ing imports or promoting more efficient enterprises that can ef-
fectively compete on world markets. 
3. Unlike many other developing countries, Mexico is fortunate 
that it has exceptional resource~ with which to make these 





As Guillermo Ortiz 23 notes: "The future task of the adjustment for the 
Mexican economy will be more related to micro-economic strategies -
deciding on the most efficient allocation of public resources - than to macro-
economic considerations. Even if the adjustment programme is successful 
from a macro-economic viewpoint, that is if inflation is controlled and bal-
ance of payments problems are avoided, this will not automatically produce 
economic growth. A stable macro-economic environment is a necessary but 
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